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Has Local Informational Advantage Disappeared?
Abstract – This study examines how changes in the information environment affect the infor-
mational advantage of geographically proximate agents. We find that the long-term advantage
of local agents disappeared at the turn of the millennium. This is accompanied by the reduction
in local bias of institutional investors and equity analysts. However, institutional investors con-
tinue to trade local stocks disproportionately more often than nonlocal stocks; moreover, their
local trades outperform nonlocal trades in the short term – even for large and liquid stocks. Our
results are consistent with improvements in the information environment shortening the horizon
of geographic proximity-based informational advantage.
1. Introduction
Existing studies document that geographic proximity affects the behavior and performance of local
agents even when there is no institutional barrier to entry. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001)
find that U.S. institutional investors overweight their local stocks – relative to other U.S. stocks
– and earn higher returns from their investments in local stocks. In a similar vein, Malloy
(2005) finds that analysts located near firm headquarters have an informational advantage. The
advantage associated with geographic proximity may arise because local agents are able to directly
inspect local firms and acquire information about these firms. They may also be able to collect
information from other local sources (e.g., customers and suppliers, local media) at a lower cost.
The informational advantage of local agents, however, should depend on the firms’ information
environment. A more opaque and less competitive environment should provide more profitable
opportunities for local agents, if they can obtain information at a lower cost. In contrast, the
lifespan of such advantage may be shortened when the playing field is more level.
One important determinant of the quality and competitiveness of firms’ information environ-
ment is regulation. Rules that curb uneven access to private information and improve the quality
of publicly available information should reduce the potential advantage of local agents. At the
turn of the millennium, the U.S. securities regulation moved further in this direction with the
enactment of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The
new rules were designed to affect the flow and timing of information dissemination, as well as
influence the quality and reliability of information that firms disclose publicly.1
During the same period, there was a breathtaking increase in the availability of and speed of
access to corporate information due to the Internet. Internet users increased from 35.8% to 61.7%
of the U.S. population between the end of 1999 and 2003.2 Although broadband access had begun
to grow, the vast majority of households continued to rely on dial-up connections at the turn of
1Reg FD was aimed at “leveling the playing field” among different types of investors. Its rules were designed
to curb selective disclosure of information to market participants and mandated the disclosure of all material
information to all investors at the same time. Similarly, SOX mandated the implementation of new rules for
financial reporting by public companies with the intent to improve its transparency, reliability, and accountability.
In particular, SOX addressed issues such as enhanced financial disclosure, auditor independence, and corporate
governance (Coates (2007)).
2See World Bank statistics: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
1
the millennium. Between the end of 1999 and 2003, however, availability of broadband access rose
from about 1% to over 20% of the U.S. population.3 This epochal technological progress allowed
wider and more timely access to firm disclosures (e.g., via the SEC’s EDGAR system of corporate
filings), as well as the widespread electronic dissemination of corporate news (e.g., Bloomberg).
If local bias and superior local performance depend on the information environment, we expect
that they would decline following these exogenous changes to the quality and competitiveness of
the environment. We first examine this conjecture using quarterly portfolio holdings of 13(f)
institutions during the 1996 to 2008 period. We observe a sharp decline in the excess local
holdings of institutional investors in the more competitive information environment. In particular,
we observe a discrete 50% drop in the average excess local institutional ownership around the turn
of the millennium. The average excess local ownership is around 8% in the old regime (1996-1999),
but only around 4% in the new regime after the turn of the millennium.4
We next investigate whether the information content of institutional investors’ local holdings
also changes around these exogenous shifts in information environment. A corollary of our main
argument is that the performance of institutional investors’ local holdings would decline in the new
regime. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Whereas institutional investors’ local
holdings obtain higher returns relative to their non-local holdings in the earlier regime (consistent
with previous literature, such as Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010)), the superior performance of local
holdings disappears in the later period. This finding poses a difficult question for the literature
on the geography of stock ownership, and particularly for studies that rely on arguments based
on disproportionate local holdings.5
We find similar patterns when examining equity analysts. Malloy (2005) documents that sell-
side equity analysts have relatively superior information about local firms using a sample that
largely consists of pre-2000 years. Consistent with the evidence for institutional investors, we
3See Pew Research Center report: http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/12/21/home-broadband-2015.
4These shifts in excess local ownership mainly reflect changes in actual local ownership levels since the expected
local ownership levels –i.e., due to the geographic clustering of firms and institutional investors– do not vary
significantly over time.
5One such paper is the study by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) titled “The Only Game in Town: Stock-Price
Consequences of Local Bias” in which the authors motivate their asset pricing analysis using the ‘incontrovertible’
existence of within country local bias (paragraph 2).
2
find that there is a significant decline in the (excess) local coverage of sell-side equity analysts
in the new regime after the turn of the millenium. Moreover, the reduction in analysts’ local
bias is accompanied by a significant reduction –in fact, a disappearance– of the local information
advantage that sell-side equity analysts seemed to enjoy in the old regime.
To shed more light on the time-series dynamics of the local information advantage and its
horizon, we tap into the recent studies that document the superior short-term performance of
institutional investors and examine their actual intraquarter trades. In particular, using trading
data provided by ANcerno, Puckett and Yan (2011) document that institutional investors earn
superior intraquarter returns on their trades and that this performance is persistent in the cross-
section of institutions. However, the information content of institutional trades is incorporated
quickly into prices as these trades do not predict returns at longer horizons. Motivated by this
evidence, we hypothesize that local investors continue to enjoy an informational advantage in the
short term - although this advantage may not exist at longer horizons as our earlier evidence
based on holdings data suggests.
We begin this analysis by examining institutional investors’ relative trading propensity among
local and nonlocal stocks. One unique advantage of the ANcerno trading data relative to 13(f)
quarterly portfolio snapshots is that it allows a direct calculation of excess trading levels within
each quarter, which can be used to detect local trading bias. Our evidence indicates that existing
studies (as well as our earlier analysis) relying on low-frequency (i.e., quarterly) holdings likely
underestimate the degree of institutional investors’ local bias. In particular, institutional investors
buy and sell local stocks disproportionately more often than they trade nonlocal stocks – even
when they do not hold more local stocks. We find that the abnormal local trading propensity
averages between 1 to 2.5 percent of the total institutional trading volume.
Institutional investors’ higher propensity to trade local stocks provides indirect evidence for
the conjecture that these investors are likely to have access to short-term private information
about local stocks. We next directly examine whether there is a corresponding pattern in rela-
tive trading performance. To measure short-term trading performance, we follow the approach
used by Puckett and Yan (2011) and analyze trading profits in the quarter in which the trades
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are executed. Extending Puckett and Yan (2011), we examine institutional trades in local and
nonlocal stocks separately, which allows us to decompose the total intraquarter performance of
institutional trading into its local and nonlocal components.6
The geography-based performance decomposition indicates that the superior average intraquar-
ter trading profits of institutional investors documented in Puckett and Yan (2011) are mostly
driven by local trades. The institutional investors in our sample earn superior intraquarter profits
in local stocks, even after adjusting for common risk characteristics and transaction costs. The
average characteristic-adjusted intraquarter return of local stocks that institutions buy is higher
than the post-trading return of local stocks that they sell by 21 to 34 basis points. This superior
local performance is observed even in relatively large and liquid stocks. In contrast, the average
nonlocal intraquarter trading profits are not significantly different from zero after accounting for
risk characteristics and transaction costs. These findings suggest that even after the epochal
changes in firms’ information environment at the turn of the millennium, geographic proxim-
ity remains a key determinant of the short-term information advantage of a typical institutional
investor.
Our analysis contributes to the intersection of three literatures: information environment, local
bias, and fund performance. First, we document that changes in the quality and competitiveness
of the information environment affect the behavior of market participants (investors and sell-side
analysts) who rely on geographic proximity. Second, our results indicate that the existing local
bias literature underestimates the degree of local information advantage of institutional investors
given its focus on mandated quarterly snapshots of institutional portfolio holdings. With the
availability of more efficient communication technologies as well as the adoption of more stringent
corporate disclosure rules, analyses of the local information advantage using quarterly portfolio
snapshots may not capture the full extent of such advantage. Indeed, our findings based on
quarterly holdings indicate that the local tilt of U.S. investor portfolios as well as their local
performance have declined sharply over time. Overall, this evidence supports the conjecture that
6In our discussion, we use “fund” and “institution” interchangeably. While each institutional investor may
operate multiple funds, our unit of observation is at the fund level following Puckett and Yan (2011).
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the increased quality and competitiveness of the information environment have eroded the long
horizon information advantage of local capital market participants.
Nonetheless, the evidence based on intraquarter trading data shows that geographic distance
remains an important determinant of aggregate market outcomes at short horizons. In particular,
our findings suggest that local investors are still more likely to be the marginal traders and
therefore play a significant role in the process of pricing financial assets, providing liquidity, and
exerting corporate governance.7 Lastly, our findings contribute to the literature on the evaluation
of players in the money management industry. We find that the superior aggregate performance of
institutional investors documented in Puckett and Yan (2011) is largely due to opportunistic local
access to corporate information. This novel finding complements the evidence from recent studies
that examine the cross-sectional variation in fund manager skill (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and
Zheng (2005, 2008)), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Amihud
and Goyenko (2013)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we develop our testable
hypotheses and describe our two main data sources. We then present our analysis based on
quarterly institutional holdings in Section 4. We examine the coverage and performance of local
analysts in Section 5. We then present our analysis of intraquarter institutional trading and
performance conditional on location in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
We review here some of the major changes that took place in the U.S. institutional environment at
the turn of the millennium, which we posit affect the investors’ information acquisition process. We
then summarize the related geography-based hypotheses at the heart of our subsequent analysis.
7See, e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) for the effect of local investors on asset prices, Shive (2012) and
Bernile et al. (2015) for the effect of local investors on stock liquidity, and Chhaochharia, Niessen-Ruenzi, and
Kumar (2012) for the effect of local investors on corporate governance.
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2.1. Changes to Information Environment
Until the late 1990s, quarterly earnings’ conference calls and communication with top-level execu-
tives were typically restricted to equity analysts and investors with substantial capital. Companies
argued that providing the same level of access to all investors would be too costly. As cheaper
communication technology became available with the advent of the Internet, this cost argument
became less relevant. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed
the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in December 1999. The general principle advocated by
the new rules was that the disclosure of material information should be made to all investors at
the same time.
Small investors supported the regulation while large investors argued that imposing equal ac-
cess for all investors would lead to firms disclosing less information (e.g., Weber (2000a, 2000b),
Shiller (2000), SEC (2000), Hasset (2000), Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004), Duarte, Han,
Harford, and Young (2008)). Despite these concerns, the SEC approved Regulation FD in Octo-
ber 2000. The market participants who enjoyed selective access to management in the pre-Reg
FD environment would likely experience the largest adverse impact of the new rules. Thus, if
geographic proximity to management facilitated such access, the curbing of selective disclosures
should reduce the competitive advantage of local agents.
Around the time of Reg FD, the fraudulent accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and
several other companies undermined the public’s confidence in corporate disclosures. For example,
fraudulent accounting practices at WorldCom resulted in over-reporting of assets by around $11
billion. These highly-publicized scandals exposed significant conflicts of interests in the relation
between corporations and their financial auditors, which cast doubts on the reliability of firm
disclosures. Following these scandals, several new proposals were introduced to curb fraudulent
accounting practices (Holmstro¨m and Kaplan (2003), Coates (2007)).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in July 2002 with widespread approval by indi-
vidual investors and investment groups, and large opposition by companies and industry groups
(Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)). The proponents of these rules advocated
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them as necessary to restore investors’ confidence. In particular, SOX mandated new rules that
would lead to enhanced financial disclosure, greater auditor independence, and improved corpo-
rate governance with the intent to improve the transparency, reliability, and accountability of
firms’ financial reports (Coates (2007)).8
Concurrent with some of the most substantial reforms in U.S. securities regulation in over half
a century, the information and communication technology environment was undergoing unprece-
dented progress. Fueled by the spreading of the Internet, this process substantially increased
the availability of and speed of access to corporate information at progressively smaller costs.
Internet users in the U.S. population nearly doubled between the end of 1999 and 2003, while the
availability of fast Internet connections across the country was increasing exponentially.9 This
technological progress facilitated the wider and faster dissemination of information about publicly
traded firms, both via institutional channels like the SEC’s EDGAR system and financial news
providers like Bloomberg.
Overall, the regulatory changes and technological trends at the turn of the millennium arguably
provide a large exogenous shock to the U.S. corporate information environment. We conjecture
that the combined effect of rules facilitating a more level the playing field in the information
collection process as well as the progressively smaller costs associated with this process made the
information environment more competitive and reduced information asymmetry among investors.
In particular, to the extent that it provided local agents with significant informational rents in
the old regime, we expect that the role of geographic proximity should diminish in the new regime
of information production, dissemination, and acquisition.
8For example, most notably, Sections 101-109 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to provide for auditors’ oversight; Sections 302, 401-406, 408-409, and 906 mandated new disclosure
rules pertaining to internal control systems and officer certifications; Sections 201-209 and 303 further regulated
public company auditors and auditor-client relationship; Sections 301, 304, 306, and 407 introduced requirements for
listed companies pertaining to the composition of audit and control committees, and banned officer loans; Sections
802, 807, 902-905, 1102, 1104, and 1106 introduced criminal penalties for fraudulent misreporting; and Sections 806
and 1107 introduced new whistle-blower protections.
9During this period, Internet users increased from 35.8% to 61.7% of the U.S. population and the availability of
broadband access rose from about 1% to over 20% of the U.S. population.
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2.2. Information Environment and Local Market Participants
Do these changes adversely affect the informational advantage of local market participants such
as institutional investors and sell-side equity analysts? Anecdotal evidence suggests that physical
proximity to firm management is likely to yield informational advantage to local agents. In fact,
in its release of Reg FD, the SEC explicitly mentioned that firms often disclose non-public infor-
mation to both securities analysts and institutional investors.10 Beyond this anecdotal evidence,
previous studies on local and home bias link excess local holdings of institutional investors to the
availability of valuable local information (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Baik, Kang,
and Kim (2010), Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2015)). Similarly, Malloy (2005) shows that
sell-side equity analysts have relatively more accurate information about local firms.
Local market participants may be able to extract greater benefits from local stocks with high
information asymmetry either due to selective access to local private information or because
geographic proximity reduces their public information gathering and processing costs. In the first
part of our analysis, we examine whether the changes in the information environment at the turn of
the millennium influence the ownership patterns of institutional investors, the coverage patterns
of equity analysts, and the informational advantage of these two important groups of market
participants. Our identification strategy uses those exogenous changes as a natural experiment
to identify the causal effect of the information environment on the (time-series) dynamics of local
ownership/coverage and local information advantage.
10Two subsequent SEC enforcement cases provide evidence of selective disclosure practices that may have ben-
efited local institutional investors. In November 2001, the SEC contested that the CEO of Siebel Systems, a
California-based technology company, disclosed nonpublic information to selected investors at an invitation-only
technology conference hosted by Goldman Sachs & Company in California. In response to questions from a Gold-
man Sachs analyst, the CEO announced that he was optimistic about the firm since the business was returning
to normal. This announcement was opposite to the negative statements made by the CEO three weeks earlier.
Following the disclosure at the conference, attendees purchased Siebel’s stocks or communicated the information
to others who purchased Siebel’s shares. Following the conference, Siebel experienced a one-day stock return of
about 20% and trading volume twice as its daily average. Thus, investors who attended the conference enjoyed a
substantial informational advantage. In another relevant enforcement case, the SEC contested in March 2002 that
the CEO of Secure Computing (John McNulty) disclosed nonpublic information about a significant contract to two
portfolio managers in violation of the Reg FD. The SEC took exception to the fact that Secure actively promoted
its stock to institutional investors through in-person presentations, in addition to a series of conference calls and
email exchanges with selected investors. Source: Secure Computing Corporation and John McNulty, Exchange Act
Release No. 46895, 2002 WL 310948 (November 25, 2002).
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2.2.1 Impact on Local Ownership and Coverage
If institutional investors’ preference for local stocks (at least partially) reflects their attempts to
exploit a potentially uneven playing field, the advent of more efficient communication technology
and regulatory changes designed to level the playing field among different types of investors should
influence the local institutional ownership patterns. In particular, adverse shocks to the sources
of local information advantage should induce institutions to reduce their holdings of local stocks.
Therefore, we conjecture that:
H1-I: As the information environment becomes more competitive at the turn of the
millennium, local ownership levels around corporate headquarters decrease and the
overall firm ownership becomes more diffused.
Following a similar logic, we predict a similar pattern in the coverage decisions of equity analysts:
H1-A: As the information environment becomes more competitive at the turn of the
millennium, analysts’ coverage of local firms declines.
2.2.2 Impact on Local information Advantage
Next, we directly investigate whether the changes in the information environment reduce the
informational advantage of local agents. In particular, to test whether the informational advantage
of local institutional investors changes in the new environment, we follow the existing literature
and estimate the holdings-based performance of local investor portfolios conditional on the regime.
We posit that:
H2-I: As the information environment becomes more competitive at the turn of the
millennium, the local component of institutional investors’ reported portfolios per-
forms worse.
Similarly, we examine how the changes in the information environment affect local sell-side
equity analysts’ forecast accuracy following previous studies (e.g., Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong
(2003), Gintschel and Markov (2004), Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006)). Our hypothesis is
that:
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H2-A: As the information environment becomes more competitive at the turn of the
millennium, the local information advantage of equity analysts declines.
2.2.3 Impact on Local Advantage Horizons
In the last part of our analysis, we examine more closely the short-term component of local in-
vestors’ informational advantage. In particular, it seems plausible that the effect of increased
competition in the information environment on local agents may vary with the horizon of the
information. Then, local investors may continue to enjoy a competitive advantage with respect
to the ability to access short-lived information and one would not be able to detect such informa-
tional advantage at coarser frequencies, e.g., based on quarterly holding reports. To conduct this
analysis, we use ANcerno data on actual intraquarter trades of institutional investors and test
three sets of hypotheses pertaining the horizon of institutional investors’ local advantage.
First, we examine the investors’ relative propensity to trade local vs. nonlocal stocks. We
conjecture that:
H3: If a short lived local information advantage persists after the changes in the
information environment, institutional investors continue to be more likely to trade in
local stocks.
Second, we examine the horizon of institutional investors’ informational advantage. We begin
by investigating the short-term performance of their trades. We follow the Puckett and Yan
(2011) method and analyze trading performance until the end of the quarter in which the trades
are executed. This allows us to decompose the performance of institutional trading into its short-
term (within-quarter) and long-term (interquarter) components. Our hypothesis is that:
H4: If a short lived local information advantage persists after the changes in the
information environment, institutional investors’ local trades continue to experience
superior intraquarter performance.
Lastly, consistent with the idea that greater competition in the information environment
shortens the horizon of the local advantage, we expect such advantage to be reflected in stock
10
prices and dissipate by the end of the trading quarter. Therefore, in line with our conjecture
relying on quarterly holdings, we posit that:
H5: If only a short lived local information advantage persists after the changes in the
information environment, institutional investors’ local trades do not display superior
interquarter performance.
In the next section, we briefly describe the main datasets used to test these empirical predic-
tions.
3. Data and Measures
3.1. Data
We use three main data sources to capture the portfolios of local agents: (1) institutional investors’
holdings snapshots from 13(f) filings, (2) IBES dataset of analyst coverage, and (3) ANcerno
dataset of institutional investors’ trading activities. We describe these datasets in turn below.
3.1.1 Institutional Holdings Data: 13(f) Quarterly Snapshots
Our first main dataset is the quarterly common stock holdings of 13(f) institutions compiled by
Thomson Reuters. We identify the location (zip code) of institutional investors using the Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Managers and by searching SEC documents and web sites of institutional
managers. We designate institutional investors as Local based on whether they locate in the same
state as the firm’s headquarters.
3.1.2 Analyst Coverage
The research coverage of sell-side equity analysts is from Thomson Reuters’ I/B/E/S database.
We augment this dataset with analyst location data provided by Hongping Tan, and designate
equity analysts as Local based on whether they locate in the same state as the covered firm’s
headquarters.
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3.1.3 Institutional Trading Data: ANcerno
We use institutional trading data provided by ANcerno. This dataset contains institutional trades
for the 1997 to 2010 period. Following previous studies, we exclude trades from 1997 and 1998
because the coverage in these two years is sparse, although our results are similar when these
trades are retained. Puckett and Yan (2011) use the same dataset and describe it in detail.11 We
use the following information from the ANcerno dataset: institutional client code, institutional
client manager code, stock historical CUSIP, stock ticker, trade date, trade direction (buy or sell),
quantity of shares traded, and trade execution price. We use the terms “fund” and “institution”
interchangeably going forward. While each institutional investor may operate multiple funds, our
unit of observation is at the fund level following Puckett and Yan (2011).
Two unique features of the ANcerno data are central to our study. First, the ANcerno dataset
provides the actual trade direction (i.e., buy or sell) for all executed trades, eliminating the need
for algorithms such as Lee and Ready (1991) to infer the direction of each trade. Second, the
ANcerno dataset provides the names of institutional client managers for our sample period. We
use these names to collect the locations of all institutions in the ANcerno database and categorize
trades as Local or Nonlocal. Local trades are those executed on stocks located in the same state as
the institution, while the remaining trades are identified as nonlocal trades. The vast majority of
institutions in ANcerno are located in the U.S. and they are the focus of our analysis. Using the
locations of institutions, we are able to categorize about 79 percent of all trades in the ANcerno
database as local or nonlocal trades.
In addition to these main data sources, we use several other standard datasets. We obtain
price, volume, return, and industry membership data from the Center for Research on Secu-
rity Prices (CRSP). The firm headquarters location data are from the CRSP-Compustat merged
(CCM) file. We obtain the performance benchmarks for computing characteristic-adjusted stock
returns from Russell Wermers’ web site.12 Data on various other firm attributes are from Com-
pustat.
11Other recent studies that use the ANcerno data include Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), Chem-
manur, He, and Hu (2009), Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011), and Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012).
12The web site is http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
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3.2. Measures
3.2.1 Excess Local Holdings Measure
The measurement of excess local holdings is at the core of our first hypothesis. We calculate
“Excess Local Weight” as the percentage of an institutional investor’s portfolio invested in stocks
headquartered in the investor’s state (local holdings) minus the percentage of the market portfolio
located in the investor’s state. We use this measure in Table 1. In addition to this institution-level
excess holdings measure, we also employ a firm-level excess ownership measure. The excess local
ownership is defined as the aggregate ownership of institutions in the firm’s HQ state minus that
state’s average institutional ownership (in all stocks). We use this measure in Figure 1 and Table
3.
3.2.2 Excess Local Coverage Measure
In addition to examining institutional investors, we also examine (sell-side) equity analysts. We
measure the quarterly local coverage of each analyst as the fraction of local stocks in that analyst’s
stock coverage portfolio:
LOCCOVa =
Local stocks covered by analyst a
All stocks covered by analyst a
We normalize this measure by the fraction of local stocks in the CRSP universe. We use this
measure in Table 4.
3.2.3 Excess Local Trading Measure
Since the ANcerno dataset records all trades made by institutional investors in their sample, we
can quantify two facets of trading: frequency and intensity. Trading frequency is measured by
the number of trades, while trading intensity is measured by dollar trading volume (i.e., dollar
amount traded).
13
The excess local trading frequency of institution i in quarter t is defined as







where #Local Tradesi,t is the number of trades of institution i in stocks headquartered in the
same state as the institution, #Tradesi,t is the total number of trades made by institution i,
#Local Stocksi,t is the number of firms headquartered in the same state as institution i, and
#Stockst is the number of all firms in both the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database with
identifiable headquarters locations.
Similarly, the excess local trading intensity of institution i in quarter t is defined as:
Excess Local T rd Inti,t =
Local Dollar V olumei,t





where Local Dollar V olumei,t is the total dollar volume that institution i trades in stocks head-
quartered in the same state as the institution, Total Dollar V olumei,t is the total dollar trading
volume of institution i, Local Market Capi,t is the market capitalization of firms headquartered
in the same state as institution i, and Total Market Capt is the aggregate market capitalization
of all firms in both the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database with identifiable headquarters
locations.
We also use an alternative measure of the excess local trading intensity for wich the second
term, i.e., the benchmark, is calculated using trading volume rather than market capitalization:
Excess Local T rd Int, Alti,t =
Local Dollar V olumei,t
Total Dollar V olumei,t
−
Trading V ol. of Local Stocksi,t
Agg. Trading V ol. of All Stockst
,
where Local Dollar V olumei,t and Total Dollar V olumei,t are as defined above. The trading
volume measures in the second term capture trades by all investors, ANcerno institutions or
otherwise: Trading Vol. of Local Stocksi,t is the total trading volume of firms headquartered in
the same state as institution i as reported by CRSP, and Agg. Trading V ol. of All Stockst is
the aggregate trading volume of all firms in both the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database
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with identifiable headquarters locations.
In each of these excess trading measures, the second term represents the expected level of
local trading. If institutional investors in our sample do not have any local bias in their trading
frequency, the proportion of local trades in the total number of trades should be equal to the
fraction of local firms in the total number of stocks in the market. Similarly, no local tilt in the
trading intensity would imply that the local trading intensity is equal to the market capitalization
(trading volume) of local firms as a proportion of the total aggregate market capitalization (trading
volume). Therefore, the excess local trading measure would be significantly positive if investors
have a local trading bias, i.e., if they trade local stocks disproportionately more often or more
intensely than they trade nonlocal stocks. We use these measures in Table 6.
4. Vanishing Local Holdings Bias and Performance
In this section we examine the investment behavior and performance of local institutional investors
using mandated quarterly snapshots.
4.1. Institution-Level Local Holdings Bias
We first examine the relative portfolio weights of local and nonlocal holdings. Specifically, we
calculate the Excess Local Weight of each institutional investor’s quarterly portfolio snapshot
as the percentage of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks located in the investor’s state
(local holdings) minus the percentage of the “market portfolio” located in the investor’s state.
We compute the average of excess local weights across all institutional investors’ portfolios each
quarter, and then report the time-series average of those quarterly averages over various periods
in Table 1. The quarterly averaging across institutions is either weighted equally or by the total
dollar value of the institution’s holdings at the beginning of the quarter. This analysis is similar
to the analysis in Coval and Moskowitz (2001), except that we use the sample of institutional
investors (rather than their mutual fund sample) and extend their analysis (that stops in 1995)
to 2008.
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Both averaging methods provide the same pattern: local bias is quite strong in the earlier
period, and declines significantly after the turn of the millennium. Using equal-weighted average,
we find that the excess local weights of institutional investors’ portfolios decline by more than 45
percent in the post-2000 period relative to the earlier period (1996–1999). Using dollar-weighted
average, the excess weights of institutional investors disappear in the post-2000 period.
4.2. Performance Estimates from Quarterly Snapshots
We next conduct a performance analysis where the unit of observation is the average quarterly
return of stocks in various location-based subportfolios of institutional investors. Using this
approach, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) reports that mutual fund managers experience higher
returns in their local stock portfolio. We repeat their analysis on the performance of institutional
investors’ local and non-local holdings by subperiods. For each institution with non-zero portfolio
weight in local stocks, we calculate the quarterly characteristics-adjusted returns of its local and
non-local portfolios, as well as the performance differential (local minus non-local). Local Portfolio
is comprised of stocks in the institutional investor’s portfolio that are located in the investor’s
state, while Non-Local Portfolio is comprised of the rest of the institution’s holdings. The portfolio
returns are adjusted using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) approach to control
for variations in size, book-to-market, and past 12-month return.
As reported in Panel A of Table 2, local holdings of institutional investors outperformed
their non-local holdings in the earlier period (1996-1999). Using dollar-weighted average, local
holdings outperform non-local holdings by about 13 basis points each month, or about 1.5 percent
annually. However, the superior performance of local holdings disappears in the post-2000 period.
The performance differential is not significantly different from zero and the point estimate is in
fact negative in the latter period.
In Panel B, we estimate the performance of institutional “trades”. Unlike our analysis in
Section 6 that employs actual trading of institutional investors, the quarterly holdings snapsots
do not allow us to observe the actual trades of these institutions. Instead, this analysis uses net
changes in quarterly holdings to measure (net) trading by institutions during a quarter. We then
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measure the average performance of net changes in local/non-local holdings. The pattern that
appears in Panel B is similar to the one that we observe in Panel A: local trades are abnormally
profitable (i.e., about 1.8% higher annual return than non-local trades) prior to 2000, but this
superior performance disappears in the latter period.
4.3. Firm-Level Aggregation
To examine the effects of the reduction in local long-term information advantage on return pre-
dictability, we aggregate our observations at the firm level. We start by examining excess local
ownership by institutions around firm headquarters. Figure 1 shows the mean excess local own-
ership computed at the end of each fiscal year using the portfolio holdings of all institutional
investors in our quarterly sample. The excess local ownership is defined as the aggregate owner-
ship of institutions in the firm’s HQ state minus that state’s average institutional ownership (in
all stocks). Small and large firms subsamples contain firms in the lowest and highest firm size
quartiles, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that the level of local institutional ownership declines markedly starting at
the turn of the millennium. The average excess local ownership level is consistently around 8% in
each year of the pre-2000 period. It drops sharply to below 6% immediately following the passage
of Reg FD and then stabilizes at a level of about 4% in the post-2004 period. Thus, the excess
local ownership of institutional investors drops by half around this period. In absolute terms, the
drop in the level of local ownership is larger for smaller firms. Specifically, the local ownership
levels for small, medium, and large firms drop from 14.42%, 5.86%, and 2.98% in 2000 to 8.46%,
2.80%, and 1.91% in 2004, respectively. However, in relative terms, excess local ownership levels
drops by about half across all size groups.13
13We perform formal statistical tests of these differences in a regression setting, controlling for changes in firm
characteristics, and continue to find similar general reduction in local ownership. We also find that firms with
worse information environments have significantly higher local ownership levels prior to 2000, but these relations
become significantly weaker after 2000. These results are reported in Table IA-1 of the Internet Appendix. We also
examine the overall geographical shifts in the composition of firm ownership. We measure geographical ownership
concentration of firms using state-level institutional ownership data. We find that firm ownership has also become
more diffused geographically. Our state-level geographic concentration measure declines from 0.171 in 2000 to 0.115
in 2004, which represents a 32.75% decline between the pre-2000 and post-2000 periods (see Table IA-2 of the
Internet Appendix).
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We next perform return predictability analysis similar to that in Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010,
henceforth BKK), who show that HQ state’s institutional ownership predicts future stock returns.
In particular, we regress subsequent quarter stock returns on the lagged level and current change
of share ownership of the following two groups of institutional investors. The first group includes
local institutions, while the second includes all non-local institutions. We use characteristics-
adjusted return computed using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method as
the dependent variable to account for potential non-linearities in the relation between certain firm
characteristics and future stock returns that a linear regression specification may not accommo-
date. We control for all stock characteristics included in the BKK study (i.e., size, B/M ratio,
and past returns) and estimate the following model using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach.
Char Adj Returnf,t+1 = βLocal ∗ Local %Ownf,t−1 + βNonLocal ∗NonLocal %Ownf,t−1→t
+ Θ ∗ Controlsf,t + ef,t.
We report three sets of regression estimates in Table 3: for the full sample (1996-2008), for the
pre-2000 subsample, and for the post-2000 subsample.
Consistent with results in BKK, we find that subsequent quarter characteristics-adjusted re-
turns vary directly with local ownership (model 1). However, these relations are much weaker in
the latter subperiod and not statistically significant (model 3). In sum, our results in this sub-
section are consistent with our earlier findings using institution-level aggregation: local holdings
bias and local (long-term) performance have declined (or even disappeared) after the turn of the
millennium.14
We also examine whether this return predictability results extend to the price discovery pro-
cess. A natural implication of our results so far is that the adverse selection concerns attributed to
local ownership should decline with the profitability of local trades after the turn of the millenium.
To test this conjecture, we examine the relation between local ownership and stock market-based
14Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2015) find that the ownership of institutional investors located in non-HQ
areas that are relevant for the firm has a sizeable, significant, and robust relation with the firm’s subsequent stock
returns. Including these semi-local ownership measures does not affect the time-series decline in Table 3.
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measures of adverse selection conditional on the information environment. We report this analysis
in Table IA-3 of the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the adverse selection compo-
nent of stock prices (e.g., ADJPIN from Duarte and Young (2009)) is directly and significantly
related to prior year-end excess local ownership levels over the whole sample period. However,
our results indicate that the relation between adverse selection measures and local ownership is
weaker and becomes statistically insignificant after 2000.15 We also find similar evidence when we
examine the link between local ownership and bid-ask spreads before earnings announcement: the
local ownership-spread relation is attenuated after 2000. Taken together, the results from these
microstructure-based tests indicate that market participants expected local investors to exhibit a
lower propensity to engage in informed trading after 2000.
5. Local Equity Analysts
Local sell-side equity analysts are likely to be adversely affected in the new information environ-
ment, to the extent that the net benefits of local access to management they may have enjoyed
in the old regime have decreased.
5.1. Equity Analysts’ Local Coverage
We start by examining the time-series variation in excess propensity of analysts to cover local
stocks. We define excess local coverage of a sell-side analyst as the fraction of local stocks covered
by the analyst minus the fraction of local stocks available to the analyst. Unlike institutional
investors, there is no obvious weighting scheme for analyst coverage. Therefore, we examine both
equal- and value-weighted local coverage fractions.
We find that sell-side analysts around corporate headquarters display excess propensity to
provide local coverage. Panel A of Table 4 reports those averages. The average excess local
coverage over the whole sample period is 9.61 (6.28) percent using equal- (value-) weighting.
However, the excess propensity to cover local stocks declines sharply in the post-2000 information
15Duarte and Young (2009) decompose the PIN measure introduced by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)
into two components: the probability of private information-related trade (i.e., ADJPIN) and the probability that
a given trade happens during a symmetric order flow shock (i.e., PSOS).)
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environment. Prior to the turn of the millennium, we find that the value- (equal-)weighted excess
local coverage is about 8.2 (11.4) percent. In the more recent regime, the excess local coverage
declines by about a quarter to 5.4 (value-weighted) or 8.8 (equal-weighted) percent.
In Panel B, we perform formal statistical tests of this decline by regressing excess local coverage
on an indicator variable for the years 2000 onwards (POST-2000), analyst characteristics, and state
fixed effects. The analyst characteristics include analyst tenure, past performance, the number of
firms covered, and an indicator variable for analysts employed by prestigious brokerage houses.
The coefficient estimates on POST-2000 in models (1) and (3) suggest that, relative to the
period prior to the changes in the information environment, excess local coverage declines by 3.07
to 3.48 percentage points in the new information environment. Focusing on the analysts employed
by prestigious brokerage houses, we find that they are less likely to cover local stocks prior to
2000. However, their excess local coverage after 2000 is similar to that of analysts employed by
less prestigious brokerage houses.
5.2. Equity Analysts’ Local Performance
We next examine the relative local performance of equity analysts. In particular, we examine the
forecast accuracy of analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. As analysts are evaluated against their
peers, we employ two relative accuracy measures that compare each analyst’s forecast against all
forecasts on the same earnings report. The first measure is an indicator for whether the analyst’s
forecast error is below the median error, while the second measure is the percentile ranking of
the analyst’s forecast error. Following Malloy (2005), we also use the demeaned absolute forecast
error (DAFE) to measure forecast accuracy, where a negative DAFE implies better than average
forecast accuracy and a positive DAFE reflects below-average forecast accuracy.
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates from regressing the analyst accuracy measures on a
LOCAL indicator variable that takes the value of one if the analyst and the firm headquarters are
located in the same state and zero otherwise, its interaction with the POST-2000 indicator, and
time-varying analyst fixed effects to capture variation in analysts’ skill and characteristics. We
do not include stand-alone regime variables or time fixed effects in these specifications because
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they are subsumed by the time-varying analyst fixed effects. We cluster the errors for all forecasts
issued for the same earnings report because they are correlated due to how our measures are
constructed.
The coefficient estimates in Table 5 suggest that local analysts are significantly more accurate
prior in the old information regime prior to 2000, consistent with the findings in Malloy (2005).
However, the superior accuracy of local analysts declines significantly after the turn of the mil-
lennium. Adding up the point estimates of LOCAL and LOCAL × POST-2000 in Columns (1),
(2), or (3), we find that superior local performance is at most negligible in the new information
regime.
When we estimate the accuracy regressions for different subperiods, similar to the evidence
in Malloy (2005), LOCAL has a significantly negative coefficient estimate in the pre-2000 period
(see Column (4)), and negative but insignificant coefficient estimate in the period after 2000 (see
Column (5)). This evidence indicates that local analysts no longer possess a local information
advantage after the changes that curtailed selective access to firm management and made the
information environment more competitive.
Collectively, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide consistent evidence for our hypotheses (H1-a
and H2-a) that the changes in the information environment at the turn of the millennium affect
local sell-side equity analysts. Prior to 2000, like local institutional investors (or even more so),
local analysts were likely to enjoy an advantage in the information-gathering process for local
firms. In the more competitive information environment after 2000, the informational advantage
of local analysts disappears.
5.3. Local Analysts and Local Investors
In this short subsection, we briefly discuss the results from an analysis examining whether the
local information advantage of analysts and institutional investors are related. Specifically, we in-
vestigate whether the recommendations from local analysts drive the local information advantage
of institutional investors. We estimate the local bias and performance of institutional investors,
conditional upon the presence of local analysts. We sort states into three groups based on the
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number of analysts in the state: top 5 states, the next 15 states (6th to 20th), and the remaining
states. This grouping is done to ensure that institutional investors are spread as evenly as possible
across the three groups. Within each group, we measure the local bias of institutional investors
as well as their portfolio performance during different subperiods.
We report the analysis in Table IA-4 of the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that
the pattern of declining local bias is similar, irrespective of the level of local analyst coverage.
However, the time-series patterns in local performance is quite different. In states with a high
number of local analysts, institutional investors do not display superior performance both before
and after the turn of the millennium. In contrast, institutional investors exhibit superior local
performance in states with low analyst presence prior to 2000. This superior local performance
weakens significantly after 2000.
This evidence suggests that the local information advantage of institutional investors in the
old regime did not merely reflect the local information advantage of equity analysts. In fact, they
are likely to have competed for local information rather than shared it. In the next section, we
examine whether the increased competitiveness of the information environment also had adverse
effects on the short-term profitability of local institutional investors’ trades.
6. Trading Dataset and Short-term Profitability
In this section, we follow the method in Puckett and Yan (2011) and analyze the performance of
institutional trades in the quarter in which the trades are executed. This method allows us to
break down the trading performance into a short-term component (intraquarter) and a long-term
component (interquarter). The interquarter performance measure corresponds to the performance
estimates obtained using quarterly snapshots in Section 4 (Table 2), while the intraquarter per-
formance estimates allow us to identify the short-term performance component that cannot be
captured using the coarser approach. We also use the averaging method and statistical tests used
in Puckett and Yan (2011). In particular, we average returns across all institution-quarters, and
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use two-way clustered standard errors.16
The sample period of our ANcerno dataset is from 1999 to 2010. Table 6 provides summary
statistics for the institutional trading data. Of particular interest is the subsample of institutions
for which we are able to identify the manager location and the latter is in the U.S. In particular,
as shown in Panel A, we are able to assign about 90% of the institutions and about 80% of the
trades to a manager in the U.S. Panel B reports the geographic distribution of ANcerno investors
across the U.S. states.
6.1. Local Trading Bias Estimates
Before examining the performance of local trades, we examine whether there is a local bias in
the trading activities of institutional investors. Panel A of Table 7 reports the equal-weighted
averages of excess local trading measures for our sample. We calculate the local trading biases for
each institution within each quarter and then report the averages across all quarters. Excess local
trading frequency is reported in the first column, while excess local trading intensity measures are
reported in the last two columns. Panel B reports the dollar-weighted averages of local trading
measures, where the institutions are weighted by their quarterly dollar trading volume.
The results in the first column are consistent with a local trading bias: institutions trade
local stocks disproportionately more often than nonlocal stocks. When we weight all institutions
equally, the average excess local trading frequency is 2.099 percent during the 1999–2010 sample
period. Similar to the estimates obtained using equal-weights, Panel B reports that institutional
investors display local trading frequency bias of 4.414 percent during the 1999–2010 period. This
evidence of higher local trading bias estimates using dollar-weighting is consistent with larger
institutions trading local stocks more actively, presumably because they have better (short-term)
information about those firms. This positive correlation between institution size and local trading
bias is in contrast to the existing holdings-based evidence in the local bias literature, in which
smaller institutions tend to display stronger local holdings bias.
16Our results are very similar when we follow an alternative method where we average returns across all in-
stitutions within each quarter and then compute the time-series average and the associated test statistic over all
quarters.
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The second and third columns report the results of our trading intensity analysis. These
results indicate that institutional investors also have a local trading intensity bias: their trading
(dollar) volume in local stocks is abnormally high. The equal-weighted average excess local trading
intensity is 1.123 percent over the full sample period. We obtain similar inference using the
alternative volume-based benchmark.
More importantly in our context, we find that local trading bias persists throughout our
sample. Whereas the equal-weighted averages seem to decline over time, the dollar-weighted
averages are more persistent, again suggesting that large institutions are more active in trading
local stocks, regardless of the regime. As reported in Table IA-5 of the Internet Appendix, the
excess local trading is significantly positive in every year after 2000.
Overall, the local trading bias estimates suggest that institutional investors trade local stocks
more heavily, potentially due to their proximity-based information advantage. Both local trad-
ing bias measures portray a consistent picture. Moreover, the intensity-based local trading bias
estimates are considerably lower than the corresponding frequency-based local trading bias esti-
mates. This evidence is consistent with local investors breaking up their trades into small orders
to reduce the price impact of their potentially information-driven trades. This effect is salient
throughout various sample periods.
The results in this table extend the prior evidence of institutional local bias, which is obtained
using mandated quarterly snapshots of portfolio holdings. With the availability of more efficient
communication technologies (e.g., the SEC’s EDGAR system during our sample period) as well
as more stringent corporate disclosure rules, analyses based on quarterly portfolio snapshots are
unlikely to capture the full extent of the local information advantage and detect the resulting
trading activity. More specifically, combining the evidence in this table and the decline in quarterly
holdings’ local bias indicates that the life of the local information advantage may have shortened
over time. To shed more light on this issue, we next directly examine the performance of local
and nonlocal trades.
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6.2. Location-Conditional Short-Term Trading Performance
In this section, we examine the intraquarter performance of institutional trades conditional on
investors’ proximity to firms whose stocks they trade. Before focusing on the location-conditional
performance estimates, we present the average total intraquarter performance of institutional
trades to facilitate comparisons with existing studies. We follow the method in Puckett and Yan
(2011) and analyze the performance of trades in the quarter in which these trades are executed.
This method allows us to break down the trading performance into a short-term component
(intraquarter) and a long-term component (interquarter). The interquarter performance measure
allows us to corroborate the performance estimates obtained using quarterly snapshots (Table
2), while the intraquarter performance estimates allow us to identify the performance component
that cannot be captured using the coarser approach (i.e., the interim trading performance). We
will focus on the latter in this section, and examine the former in the next section.
The first column (“All Trades”) in Table 8 reports the full-sample average intraquarter per-
formance. We use the averaging method and statistical tests used in Puckett and Yan (2011). In
particular, we average returns across all institution-quarters, and use two-way clustered standard
errors.17 The sample period is from 1999 to 2010.
We find that stocks that institutions buy outperform those they sell by about 50.5 ba-
sis points (33.2 bps) when we use equal-weighted (principal-weighted) averages and control for
characteristics-based performance benchmarks (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1997).
This DGTW characteristics-adjusted performance difference remains positive when we account
for trading commissions (= 12.8 bps), but it is statistically significant only when we use equal-
weights in Panel A (t-statistic = 1.98). These intraquarter performance patterns are similar to
the evidence in Puckett and Yan (2011). There are some differences in the magnitude of our
estimates because we extend the sample period by several years and exclude trades for which we
cannot identify the institution location or for which the institution is not domiciled in the U.S.
To estimate the intraquarter performance of local and nonlocal trades, we again follow the
17Our results are very similar when we follow an alternative method where we average returns across all in-
stitutions within each quarter and then compute the time-series average and the associated test statistic over all
quarters.
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Puckett and Yan (2011) method described above. We report the proximity-based performance
decomposition estimates in the last three columns of Table 8. The “Local Trades” column in
Table III reports the average interim trading performance in local stocks, while the “Nonlocal
Trades” column reports the average interim trading performance in the remaining nonlocal stocks.
When we compute equal-weighted (principal-weighted) averages, local stocks that institutions buy
outperform local stocks they sell by 70.1 bps (50.2 bps) after controlling for stock characteristics.
Even when we account for trading commissions, the average equal-weighted (principal-weighted)
intraquarter performance differential between local buys and sells is significant, 33.9 bps (20.9
bps), and larger than for “All Trades”.18
To provide an economic interpretation of these results, we obtain rough estimates of annualized
performance. Assuming that trades are uniformly distributed within the quarter, the average
horizon of intraquarter return is half quarter. Therefore, the annualized buy minus sell (buy–
sell) performance differential is about eight times the averages reported in Table III. Specifically,
the equal-weighted and principal-weighted annualized buy–sell performance differentials of local
trades translate to 2.71 and 1.67 percentage points, respectively, net of transactions costs.
In contrast to the superior performance of local trades, the magnitudes of the average estimates
in the “Nonlocal Trades” column are lower than those in the “All Trades” column. In particular,
the buy–sell characteristics-adjusted return differential after accounting for trading commissions is
not significantly different from zero, whether we use equal-weighted or principal-weighted averages:
−2.6 bps or −7.7 bps, respectively. When comparing local and nonlocal trades, we find that the
local buy−sell intraquarter performance is significantly higher than its nonlocal counterpart (see
the last column of Table 8), both for the equal-weighted and principal-weighted averages.
Moreover, when we divide the sample into three subperiods of four years (1999–2002, 2003–
2006, and 2007–2010; in the last three rows of each panel), the difference between local and
nonlocal trades’ interim performance is positive and statistically significant in each subperiod.
18We also examine the trading activity of local and nonlocal investors prior to earnings announcements in an
attempt to identify the potential source of local short-term information advantage. We report the results of this
analysis in Table IA-6 in the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that local traders are more active ahead of
earnings surprises and are able to execure more profitable trades, consistent with their informational advantage
coming from superior access to local private information.
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This evidence indicates that local institutional investors have superior ability to time their trades
within a quarter than their nonlocal counterparts.
6.3. Firm Attributes and Short-Term Trading Performance
In this section, we investigate whether the superior intraquarter performance of institutional trades
is concentrated among stocks with certain characteristics. Our conjecture is that if superior local
performance is due to opportunistic access to private information, those profitable opportunities
could arise for all types of stocks. Consequently, institutions would earn higher intraquarter
trading profits in local stocks even among large and relatively liquid stocks. This conjecture is
in contrast to prior literature examining local performance using holdings snapshots that report
superior local performance among smaller and less liquid stocks (see, for example, Coval and
Moskowitz (2001) and Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010)). However, stock prices of larger firms and
more liquid stocks are likely to be more efficient, and therefore it may be difficult to capture local
information advantage in those stocks using quarterly snapshots. The ANcerno trading data allow
us to capture local information advantage even in liquid stocks. Indeed, trading in stocks with
higher liquidity may allow informed local traders to benefit from their informational advantage
without incurring too much price impact.
Table 9 reports the average intraquarter performance of institutional trades in various sub-
samples sorted by stock characteristics. This set of characteristics includes firm size, stock price,
idiosyncratic volatility and skewness, and two liquidity measures (i.e., average relative spread
and the Amihud illiquidity measure). We classify stocks into two groups, High (above the NYSE
median) and Low (below the NYSE median), using each of these characteristics separately and
compare the institutional trading performance among local and nonlocal stocks. In particular,
we calculate the mean return difference between buy and sell trades in local and nonlocal stocks
within each characteristics-based subsample.
We find that local buys outperform local sells in all subsamples. Although the magnitude of
local performance varies across subsamples, the difference in local performance estimates between
High and Low subsamples is never statistically significant for any firm characteristic. This evidence
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is consistent with institutions having access to valuable short-term information among all types
of local stocks. In contrast, nonlocal buys do not significantly outperform nonlocal sales in all
characteristics-based subsamples. In particular, the differences are not significant among large
and low skewness subsamples. Further, the difference between local and nonlocal performance
estimates is significant even for subsamples of more liquid stocks, e.g., low Amihud or low relative
spread stocks.
These results indicate that local short-term information advantage is not related to stock char-
acteristics and that, unlike nonlocal trades, local trades are informative even when the market is
relatively liquid. This evidence is consistent with local channels of short-term information that
allow better timed and more profitable trades across all types of stocks. In contrast, while insti-
tutions earn significant nonlocal trading profits in the subset of less liquid stocks, their nonlocal
trading profits are significantly smaller in relatively more liquid stocks. This evidence is consistent
with skilled investors having difficulty extracting rents in liquid stocks for which market prices
are likely to be more efficient.
6.4. Implied Net Quarterly Trades
We next examine the profitability of institutional investors’ local and nonlocal trades in the longer
run. In particular, we investigate whether the (implied) net quarterly trades of institutional
investors in our sample have the ability to predict stock returns in the subsequent quarter. Again,
our performance estimation method closely follows Puckett and Yan (2011) who refer to the buy
minus sell return difference as “implied quarterly trading performance.” For each institution-stock
pair, we calculate the cumulative net trading between the start and end of each quarter. We then
calculate the DGTW equal- and principal-weighted abnormal returns for buys (i.e., stocks with
positive net quarterly trading) and sells (i.e., stocks with negative net quarterly trading) portfolios
separately over the subsequent quarter. We finally compute the return difference between the buy
and sell portfolios.
Table 10 presents the implied quarterly trading performance estimates for all stocks, local
stocks, and nonlocal stocks. We find that none of the buy–sell return differential is significant,
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including among local stocks. Specifically, during the subsequent quarter, local stocks in which
institutions increase positions do not outperform local stocks in which they reduce positions. This
evidence corroborates our earlier analysis using the net changes in quarterly holdings (Panel B of
Table 2) and indicates that the superior local performance of the average institutional trader in
our sample is driven by short-lived local information. The results here highlight the importance
of using trading data rather than coarser quarterly portfolio snapshots for accurately measuring
the potential local information advantage of institutional investors.
Overall, the location-conditional intraquarter performance estimates in Tables 8 and 9 suggest
that the superior average trading performance of institutional investors documented in Puckett
and Yan (2011) is mostly due to local trading. Moreover, consistent with Puckett and Yan,
the estimates in Table 10 show that the superior local performance of institutional investors’
intraquarter trades is short-lived. Combined with the local trading patterns documented in the
previous section, the evidence suggests that local institutional investors retain a significant infor-
mational advantage at short horizons in the new information environment. Therefore, albeit at
shorter horizons, geography can still play an important role for aggregate market outcomes.
7. Summary and Conclusion
This study examines whether exogenous shocks to the information environment induced by reg-
ulatory changes and technological progress reduce the local bias and local information advantage
of capital market participants – i.e., institutional investors and equity analysts. We find that
in the new information environment, the average firm-level local bias is cut by about half and
firm ownership becomes more diffused geographically. Further, the local information advantage
of institutional investors around corporate headquarters declines sharply. The decline in local
institutional ownership is more salient among firms that had more opaque information environ-
ments prior to the regulatory changes. The local information advantage of sell-side equity analysts
exhibits a similar declining pattern and disappears after the turn of the millennium.
However, geographic proximity between firms and investors appears to still be relevant. The
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evidence on intraquarter trading activities indicates that institutional investors continue to display
a higher propensity to trade local stocks and obtain superior local short-term performance, even
in large and liquid stocks. This suggests that investors continue to enjoy local informational rents,
albeit short-lived, and local investors are still likely to play a key role in the price discovery process
of financial assets.
Beyond the contribution to the local bias literature, our findings may have important policy
implications. Specifically, Puckett and Yan (2011) argue that the informational advantage of
skilled investors would be eroded by higher frequency of portfolio disclosures that could allow other
investors to reverse-engineer skilled traders’ investment strategies. However, it is not obvious that
a short-lived local information advantage would be negatively affected by regulations mandating
a higher frequency of portfolio disclosures. Such requirements may in fact be beneficial to the
typical local institutional investor, if they allowed such investor to capitalize on local information
more quickly. In addition, the higher disclosure frequency would increase the speed with which
local information is incorporated into market prices and thus make them more efficient.
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Figure 1. Excess local ownership around firm headquarters. This figure shows the mean excess equal-
weighted local ownership time series for the full sample of firms. Excess local ownership is the state institutional
ownership of a firm’s HQ state minus that state’s average state institutional ownership. Small and large firms
subsamples contain firms in the lowest and highest firm size quartiles, respectively. Additional details about the




Table 1. Local Bias at Institutional Level: Subperiod Estimates 
This table reports the abnormal fraction of institutional investors’ equity holdings invested in local stocks. 
Excess Local Weight is the percentage of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks located in the 
investor’s state (local stocks) minus the percentage of the “market portfolio” located in the investor’s 
state. We take the average of excess weights across all institutions each quarter, and then report the time-
series average of those quarterly averages. The quarterly averaging across institutions is either weighted 
equally (first row) or weighted by the total dollar value of the institution’s holdings at the beginning of 
the quarter (second row). The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 
 Excess Local Portfolio Weight 
 1996-1999 2000-2008 
   
Equal-Weighted Average 2.63% 1.41% 
 
  
Holdings-Weighted Average 0.97% -0.17% 





Table 2. Performance of Institutional Investors in Local and Non-Local Stocks:  
Subperiod Estimates 
 
This table reports the average performance of institutional investors’ local and non-local holdings and 
trading, for different subperiods of our sample. For each institution with non-zero portfolio weight in 
local stocks, we calculate the monthly characteristics-adjusted returns of its non-local portfolio, as well as 
the performance differential between the local and non-local sub-portfolios. We divide each institutional 
investor’s quarterly portfolio into 3 mutually exclusive categories: Local HQ, Local ER1−3, and Non-
Local. We exclude Local ER stocks in this table. Panel A reports the holdings-based performance of the 
non-local portfolio and the performance differential between local HQ portfolio and the non-local 
portfolio. Panel B reports the corresponding trading-based performance; trading- based performance is 
defined as the difference in monthly returns of the holdings snapshot at the end of the preceding quarter 
minus the holdings snapshot at the beginning of the preceding quarter. We report mean portfolio 
characteristic-adjusted returns based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) method. We 
compute the average values of the portfolio performance estimates across all institutions each month, and 
then report the time-series averages of the monthly averages. The monthly averaging across institutions is 
value-weighted by the total dollar value of the institution’s holdings at the beginning of the quarter (for 
Panel A) or by the total dollar value of holdings that experience net change in portfolio position (for Panel 
B). The non-local (NL) performance is reported in the first row of each panel, while the differences in 
performance between local HQ and non-local are reported in the remaining rows. The t -statistics reported 
in parentheses below the Non Local performance estimates (i.e., the first row in each panel) are for the 
null hypothesis of zero Non-Local performance. The t -statistics below the performance differential 
estimates between the local HQ and non-local stocks are for the null hypothesis of no difference in mean 
performance across local HQ and non-local institutional sub-portfolios. Both types of t -statistics are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). 
 
Panel A. Holding Performance 
Sample Period: All 1996-1999 2000-2008 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Non-Local (NL) 0.096 0.113 0.088 
(t-stat) (1.11) (1.04) (0.84) 
    
Difference in Performance between Local and Non-Local 
Local HQ minus NL  -0.004 0.129 -0.064 
(t-stat vs. NL) (-0.03) (1.06) (-0.52) 
    
Panel B. Trading Performance 
Sample Period: All 1996-1999 2000-2008 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Non-Local (NL) 0.076 0.148 0.044 
(t-stat) (1.57) (1.78) (0.52) 
    
Difference in Performance between Local and Non-Local 
Local HQ minus NL  0.017 0.154 -0.044 




Table 3.  Firm-level Return Regression 
This table reports the regression of stock returns on the ownership of local and non-local institutional 
investors, for different subperiods of our sample. We perform Fama-MacBeth regression of quarterly 
stock returns on various firm characteristics, including Local Ownership %, the share ownership of local 
institutional investors, and Non-Local Ownership %, the share ownership of non-local institutional 
investors.  Control variables include firm size (market capitalization), market-to-book ratio, lagged stock 
return, two measures of liquidity (Amihud illiquidity measure and effective spread), idiosyncratic 
volatility, and skewness.  T-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following 
Newey-West (1987). 
 
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Stock Return, in% 
Sample Period: 1996-2008 1996-1999 2000-2008 
    
Local Ownership % 1.786 2.998 0.877 
 (2.46) (2.44) (0.84) 
Non-Local Ownership % 0.071 0.022 0.107 
 (1.23) (0.45) (1.09) 
Size -0.025 0.270 -0.247 
 (-0.13) (2.83) (-0.92) 
M/B Ratio -0.084 -0.069 -0.095 
 (-4.02) (-2.07) (-3.79) 
Lagged Return 0.918 1.682 0.346 
 (2.80) (5.17) (0.76) 
Amihud Illiquidity 0.890 1.384 0.519 
 (4.90) (4.10) (4.75) 
Effective Spread -0.208 -0.350 -0.101 
 (-0.85) (-1.49) (-0.28) 
Volatility -0.600 0.169 -1.177 
 (-1.54) (0.17) (-1.57) 
Skewness 0.094 -0.054 0.206 
 (1.53) (-0.58) (5.25) 
Intercept 3.680 5.368 2.415 
 (2.71) (6.03) (1.05) 
    
Average R2 0.041 0.036 0.045 





Table 4. Local Analyst Coverage Analysis 
 
This table presents equity analysts’ coverage of local stocks.  Panel A reports the average excess coverage 
of local stocks.  The excess coverage is defined as the difference between the fraction of local stocks in an 
analyst’s stock coverage portfolio and the fraction of local stocks that the analyst can potentially cover 
within the CRSP universe. Panel B reports the estimates from local coverage regressions of sell-side 
equity analysts. The dependent variable is excess coverage of local stocks. In the first two columns, we 
use equal-weighted fractions, while in the last two columns, we use value-weighted fractions. The 
independent variables include indicator variable for Post 2000 (year 2000 onward), analyst characteristics 
(tenure, past performance, and number of firms covered), and an indicator variable for analysts employed 
by prestigious brokerage houses. All specifications include state fixed effects. The definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors clustered by year and state. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 
Panel A. Excess Local Coverage 
 
Mean of Excess Coverage of Local Stocks 
 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
   
1996-2008 9.61% 6.28% 
1996-1999 11.38% 8.17% 
2000-2008 8.83% 5.44% 
   
 
Panel B. Regression Estimates 
  Dependent Variable: Excess Coverage of Local Stocks (in %) 
 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post 2000 −3.48 −4.76 −3.07 −4.48 
 
(−5.23) (−6.25) (−4.91) (−6.84) 
PBroker −1.62 −4.14 −1.25 −4.02 
 
(−2.59) (−4.20) (−1.8) (−5.28) 










High Performance 0.09 0.10 0.90 0.92 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.91) (0.93) 
Tenure −0.06 −0.06 0.11 0.12 
 
(−0.3) (−0.27) (0.37) (0.4) 
Number of Firms Covered −0.18 −0.18 −0.15 −0.15 
 (−5.41) (−5.46) (−4.27) (−4.31) 
 
    State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 23,518 23,518 23,516 23,516 





Table 5. Local Forecast Accuracy Regression Estimates 
 
This table reports the estimates from forecast accuracy and market reaction regressions. The dependent 
variable is one of the measures of analyst quarterly earnings forecast error. The independent variables 
include an indicator variable Local and its interaction with Post 2000 (year 2000 onward). Local is set to 
one if the analyst and the firm headquarters are in the same state. We do not include the stand-alone 
regime variables since they are subsumed by the time-varying analyst fixed effects. The definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 
Dependent Variable: ERRMDN ERRPCTL DAFE 
Sample Period: Full Full Full 1996-1999 2000-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent Variables      
      Local 0.92 −0.35 −0.44 −0.44 −0.02 
 
(2.67) (−2.47) (−1.65) (−1.65) (−0.10) 
Local × Post 2000 −1.06 0.22 0.42 
  
 






 Analyst × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 811,669 811,669 786,605 276,729 509,876 
Adj. R2 0.156 0.164 0.121 0.103 0.149 
P-value 
    
    (Local + Local×Post 2000) 0.628 0.303 0.918     
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Table 6. Trading Data Coverage 
  
This table provides the summary statistics of the sample.  Panel A reports the summary statistics of 
ANcerno database by subsample periods, while Panel B reports the geographical distribution of ANcerno 
funds and local trades. The columns under “Full ANcerno Sample” report the summary statistics for the 
set of common stocks appearing in both the CRSP and ANcerno databases without imposing stock and 
fund location filter. The columns under “With Location Data” report the summary statistics for the subset 
of observations with identifiable stock and fund locations. Local trades are those executed by ANcerno 
funds headquartered within the same state as firm headquarter state.  Institutional trading data are 
obtained from ANcerno Ltd. ANcerno fund headquarter location data are hand collected from SEC filings 
using the EDGAR. The sample includes only common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the 
CRSP database). Sample period is from January 1999 to December 2010. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
  Full ANcerno Sample   With Location Data 
 
1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 
 
1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 
Total number of funds 3,235 2,780 2,096 
 
2,916 2,535 1,871 
Total number of institutions 565 545 552 
 
490 488 478 
Total number of stocks 7,590 6,044 5,365 
 
6,895 5,482 4,613 
 
Total number of trades (millions) 32.50 76.96 113.43 
 
25.36 60.21 89.00 
Total share volume (billion) 400.78 496.11 468.34 
 
311.49 341.60 277.74 
Total dollar volume ($trillion) 10.77 13.20 13.03 
 
8.34 8.80 7.69 
 
Average share volume / trade 12,331 6,446 4,129 
 
12,284 5,673 3,121 
Median share volume / trade 1,600 320.56 193.57 
 
1,600 243.63 131.63 
Average dollar volume / trade 331,252 171,473 114,869 
 
328,958 146,132 86,426 
Median dollar volume / trade 40,000 10,170 5,278   39,494 5,926 3,709 
 






















AK 6 4 
 
KS 18 470 
 
NY 1,300 10,942,792 
AL 2 0 
 
KY 15 105 
 
OH 75 119,383 
AR 1 116 
 
LA 5 58 
 
OR 59 9,934 
CA 634 3,380,523 
 
MA 675 1,964,493 
 
PA 288 125,347 
CO 116 22,775 
 
MD 109 24,329 
 
RI 2 0 
CT 168 46,628 
 
MI 20 2,869 
 
TN 47 1,082 
DC 15 170 
 
MN 83 29,127 
 
TX 128 134,561 
DE 62 1,827 
 
MO 63 170,726 
 
UT 22 819 
FL 72 69,651 
 
MT 3 0 
 
VA 59 9,089 
GA 117 39,211 
 
NC 61 90,793 
 
VT 1 0 
HI 2 0 
 
NH 2 0 
 
WA fs89 74,365 
IA 2 468 
 
NJ 173 233,007 
 
WI 114 23,138 
IL 394 503,343 
 
NM 13 0 
 
WY 14 0 
IN 1 90   NV 12 66         
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Table 7. Local Trading Bias 
 
This table presents fund-level local trading bias estimates. Local trading frequency bias (XLocalTrdFreq) 
is defined as the ratio of the number of trades in stocks headquartered in the fund headquarter state to all 
trades made by the funds, minus the ratio of the number of stocks headquartered in the fund headquarter 
state to number of all stocks in both the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database with identifiable 
headquarter locations. Local trading intensity bias (XLocalTrdInt) is defined as the ratio of dollar trading 
volume of stocks headquartered in the fund headquarter state to the fund’s total dollar trading volume, 
minus the ratio of total market capitalization of stocks headquartered in the fund headquarter state to that 
of all stocks with identifiable headquarter locations. The benchmark in the alternative local trading 
intensity bias (XLocalTrdInt, Alt) uses total dollar volume rather than market capitalization.  We then take 
the average across funds and quarters, either as simple average (in panel A) or as weighted average using 
the fund’s total trading volume to weight the fund-level local bias observations. All measures are reported 
in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are computed based on two-way clustered 
standard errors. Institutional trading data are obtained from ANcerno Ltd. Firm headquarter location data 
are from SEC Analytic Suite. ANcerno fund headquarter location data are hand collected from SEC 
filings using the EDGAR. Local trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered within the 
same state as firm headquarter state. Nonlocal trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered 
outside the firm headquarter state. The sample includes only common stocks (those with a share code of 









Local Trading Intensity Bias 




(XLocalTrdInt, Alt),  
in % 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
    
All 2.099 1.123 0.535 
 (8.94) (4.16) (2.27) 
1999-2002 2.842 1.699 0.542 
 (7.37) (3.89) (1.24) 
2003-2006 1.814 0.927 0.601 
 (6.86) (3.02) (2.00) 
2007-2010 1.632 0.734 0.464 
 (8.25) (2.97) (1.67) 
    
 
Panel B. Weighted by Dollar Amount of Principal 
    
All 4.414 2.523 1.793 
 (4.95) (2.60) (3.52) 
1999-2002 4.075 2.958 0.472 
 (2.73) (2.19) (0.73) 
2003-2006 5.230 2.396 2.798 
 (5.18) (1.76) (2.91) 
2007-2010 3.815 2.283 1.836 
 (6.65) (3.97) (3.26) 
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Table 8. Local and Nonlocal Intraquarter Trading Performance 
 
This table reports the average intraquarter trading performance of local and non-local trades. For each 
trade, we calculate the raw return from the execution price until the end of the quarter. Specifically, raw 
trade return = (CRSP quarter-end price – ANcerno price)/ ANcerno price. We adjust these holding-period 
return calculations using both stock splits and dividend distributions. The characteristic-adjusted returns 
are computed using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW) (1997) method. In particular, 
we calculate characteristic-adjusted trade return by subtracting the DGTW benchmark return within the 
same time period (from trade date to the quarter-end date). For each fund in each quarter, we compute the 
equal-weighted and the principal-weighted DGTW adjusted returns separately for buys and sells. We take 
the difference in DGTW adjusted returns between buys and sells. We then compute the average across all 
funds and quarters. Panel A presents equal-weighted returns, and Panel B presents principal-weighted 
returns. Institutional trading data are obtained from ANcerno Ltd. Firm headquarter location data are from 
SEC Analytic Suite. ANcerno fund headquarters location data are hand collected from SEC filings using 
the EDGAR. Local trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered within the same state as 
firm headquarter state. Nonlocal trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered outside the 
firm headquarter state. The sample includes only common stocks (those with a share codeof 10 or 11 in 
the CRSP database). All trade returns are reported in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, 






    
Local minus 
Sample Period Trade Directions All Local Non-Local Non-Local 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
      
All Buy 0.626 0.736 0.547 0.189 
  (4.73) (4.85) (3.43) (2.12) 
All Sell 0.121 0.035 0.185 -0.150 
  (1.40) (0.28) (2.17) (-1.54) 
All Buy-Sell 0.505 0.701 0.362 0.340 
  (7.99) (5.62) (4.98) (3.21) 
All Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.128 0.339 -0.026 0.365 
  (1.98) (2.69) (-0.41) (3.48) 
      
1999-2002 Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.230 0.458 -0.024 0.482 
  (3.78) (3.05) (-0.26) (2.35) 
2003-2006 Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.079 0.150 0.039 0.111 
  (0.77) (1.96) (0.35) (1.98) 
2007-2010 Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.301 0.450 0.103 0.347 
  (2.67) (3.38) (0.93) (2.45) 
      












    
Local minus 
Sample Period Trade Directions All Local Non-Local Non-Local 
 
Panel B. Weighted by Dollar Amount of Principal 
      
All Buy 0.443 0.514 0.331 0.183 
  (3.93) (4.63) (3.26) (2.05) 
All Sell 0.111 0.012 0.123 -0.111 
  (1.22) (0.11) (1.88) (-1.28) 
All Buy-Sell 0.332 0.502 0.208 0.294 
  (5.28) (4.02) (3.51) (3.07) 
All Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.043 0.209 -0.077 0.286 
  (0.69) (2.37) (-0.92) (2.67) 
      
1999-2002 Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.133 0.362 -0.082 0.444 
  (2.01) (2.84) (-0.62) (2.24) 
2003-2006 Buy-Sell after Commissions -0.113 0.020 -0.182 0.202 
  (-1.49) (0.14) (-7.92) (1.70) 
2007-2010 Buy-Sell after Commissions 0.275 0.372 0.105 0.267 
  (1.46) (1.70) (0.86) (2.03) 
      




Table 9. Intraquarter Trading Performance, Conditional on Stock Characteristics 
 
This table reports the local and nonlocal institutional interim trading performance by stock characteristics. 
Market Cap is defined as the number of shares outstanding times the share price. Price is the share price 
of the stock traded. Firm size and price are as of the end of the previous quarter. Relative Spread is the 
difference between daily closing ask and bid prices divided by the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. 
Amihud illiquidity measure is the daily ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume. The two 
liquidity variables are measured during the twelve month period until the end of the previous quarter. 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Idiosyncratic Skewness) is defined as the standard deviation (skewness) of the 
residuals from three-year rolling-regressions of monthly returns on the Fama-French (1993) three factors 
plus the momentum factor. For each stock characteristic, we group all stocks into two categories, those 
below the NYSE median (the Low group) and those above the NYSE median (the High group). For each 
trade, we calculate the characteristic-adjusted return using the execution price and the end of quarter 
price, following Table 8. For each fund in each quarter, we compute the principal-weighted returns 
separately for buys and sells. We take the difference in returns between buys and sells. For each stock 
characteristic category, we report the simple average across all fund-quarters of the abnormal local and 
non-local trading performance as well as the difference between local and non-local trading performance. 
Local trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered within the same state as firm 
headquarter state. Nonlocal trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered outside the firm 
headquarter state. Detailed data description is provided in Table 8. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, 
which are computed based on two-way clustered standard errors. All trade returns are reported in 
percentage. Sample period is from January 1999 to December 2010. 
 
  
Abnormal Trading Performance, in % 
  
Local (L) Non-Local (NL) L-NL 
     
Market Cap Low 0.323 (2.27) 0.294 (2.86) 0.029 (0.33) 
 
High 0.389 (3.30) 0.135 (1.55) 0.254 (1.72) 
 
Low-High -0.067 (-0.41) 0.159 (1.23) 
 
     
Price Low 0.408 (3.27) 0.331 (3.15) 0.077 (0.56) 
 
High 0.299 (2.57) 0.152 (1.93) 0.147 (1.18) 
 
Low-High 0.109 (0.85) 0.179 (1.74) 
 
     
Relative Spread Low 0.473 (3.23) 0.132 (1.71) 0.341 (2.10) 
 
High 0.268 (2.35) 0.352 (3.48) -0.084 (-0.61) 
 
Low-High 0.205 (1.14) -0.220 (-2.21) 
 
     
Amihud Illiquidity Low 0.438 (3.46) 0.149 (1.80) 0.290 (2.22) 
 
High 0.304 (2.14) 0.388 (3.98) -0.084 (-0.53) 
 
Low-High 0.134 (0.81) -0.239 (-2.11) 
 
     
Idiosyncratic Volatility Low 0.327 (3.31) 0.244 (2.95) 0.083 (0.61) 
 
High 0.423 (2.66) 0.203 (1.94) 0.220 (1.95) 
 
Low-High -0.096 (-0.53) 0.041 (0.35) 
 
     
Idiosyncratic Skewness Low 0.281 (2.16) 0.064 (0.79) 0.217 (1.56) 
 
High 0.486 (3.43) 0.382 (3.95) 0.104 (0.70) 
 Low-High -0.205 (-1.31) -0.317 (-3.79) 
 





Table 10. Implied Quarterly Trading Performance 
This table presents implied quarterly local and non-local trading performance of funds. For each fund and 
each stock in quarter t, we calculate the net trading position by subtracting total shares sold from total 
shares bought over the quarter. We then calculate the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW) 
equal- and principal-weighted abnormal return performance for buys (positive net trading imbalance) and 
sells (negative trading imbalance) separately over the subsequent quarter and compute the difference 
between buys and sells. We then compute a simple average across all funds and quarters. Panel A 
presents equal-weighted returns, and Panel B presents principal-weighted returns. Local trades are those 
executed by ANcerno funds headquartered within the same state as firm headquarter state. Nonlocal 
trades are those executed by ANcerno funds headquartered outside the firm headquarter state. Detailed 
data description is provided in Table 8. All returns are reported in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics, which are computed based on two-way clustered standard errors. Sample period is from 




    
Local minus 
 
All Local Non-Local Non-Local 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
     
Buy -0.742 -0.662 -0.753 0.091 
 (-2.58) (-2.35) (-2.59) (0.22) 
Sell -0.558 -0.523 -0.600 0.077 
 (-2.04) (-1.87) (-2.24) (0.20) 
Buy-Sell -0.185 -0.139 -0.153 0.014 
 (-1.52) (-0.99) (-1.32) (0.08) 
     
 
Panel B. Weighted by Dollar Amount of Principal 
     
Buy -0.901 -0.803 -0.907 0.104 
 (-2.85) (-2.87) (-2.84) (0.24) 
Sell -0.651 -0.471 -0.721 0.249 
 (-2.15) (-1.69) (-2.40) (0.60) 
Buy-Sell -0.249 -0.331 -0.186 -0.145 
 (-2.07) (-2.54) (-1.54) (-0.81) 
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This internet appendix provides supplementary material to the paper “Has Local Informational 
Advantage Disappeared?” This document contains tables that are referenced in the paper, but are 





Table IA-1. Information Environment and Excess Local Ownership 
 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics for the 
relation between firm-level excess local ownership (LOCOWN) and the characteristics of the firm information 
environment conditional on the regulatory regime. LOCOWN is the excess local ownership, measured as the 
ownership ratio of institutional investors in the firm’s HQ state minus the average of those investors’ ownership 
ratio in other firms in that state. We include time-varying firm and state characteristics in the regression, as well as 
state fixed effects. The ownership variable is measured as of the fiscal year end, and all explanatory variables are 
measured during the same fiscal year. Post-2000 is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years ending in 2000 
and onward. The local ownership variable in Column (3) is recalculated after excluding institutional investors that 
are classified as public or corporate pension funds, university endowments, or miscellaneous.  The results in 
Columns (4) through (6) are based on samples excluding stocks priced below $2, firms located in California or New 
York states, and high-tech firms, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by year and state. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 
Dependent Variable: LOCOWN, Excess Local Ownership (in %) 
   
No PF Pr>$2 No CA/NY No Tech 
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post-2000 -2.46 -5.23 -5.05 -4.63 -5.35 -4.36 
 
(-4.6) (-2.8) (-2.4) (-2.4) (-2.6) (-2.3) 
Turnover 
 
-0.69 -0.75 -0.58 -1.13 -0.73 
  
(-2.8) (-2.6) (-2.7) (-3.6) (-2.8) 
Post-2000 x Turnover 
 
0.42 0.41 0.36 0.77 0.5 
  
(1.6) (1.3) (1.5) (2.3) (1.7) 
Idio. Volatility 
 
0.21 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.2 
  
(3.4) (3.3) (3.1) (2.8) (3.1) 
Post-2000 x Idio. Volatility 
 
-0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.25 -0.21 
  
(-3.6) (-3) (-3.4) (-2.9) (-3.1) 
Idio. Skewness 
 
0.07 0.1 0.1 0.06 -0.11 
  
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (-0.4) 
Post-2000 x Idio. Skewness 
 
0.05 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.34 
  
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.5) (1.1) 
Major Auditor 
 
-7.15 -7.32 -6.28 -8.83 -6.38 
  
(-5.6) (-5.7) (-4.8) (-4.8) (-6.2) 
Post-2000 x Major Auditor 
 
5.03 5.16 4.33 5.24 3.87 
  
(3.8) (3.7) (3.1) (2.7) (3.4) 
Analyst Indicator 
 
-4.28 -4.08 -3.56 -4.76 -4.7 
  
(-5.8) (-5.5) (-4.7) (-6.5) (-5.2) 
Post-2000 x Analyst Indicator 
 
1.2 0.84 0.75 2.89 1.39 
  
(1.1) (0.8) (0.7) (3.3) (1.2) 
Discretionary Accrual Rank 
 
0.27 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.11 
  
(1.3) (0.6) (1.3) (0.5) (0.5) 
Post-2000 x Discretionary Accrual Rank  -0.17 0.04 -0.16 -0.03 -0.05 
  
(-0.7) (0.2) (-0.6) (-0.1) (-0.2) 
Local Analyst Indicator 
 
0.64 0.81 0.57 1.19 0.8 
  
(1.6) (2.2) (1.5) (3.5) (2.2) 
Post-2000 x Local Analyst Indicator -0.96 -1.22 -0.65 -0.92 -0.96 
  
 
(-2.1) (-2.8) (-1.5) (-2.2) (-2.2) 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 40,640 36,558 36,558 34,846 24,940 25,695 




Table IA-2.  Geographic Concentration of Institutional Ownership 
This table reports annual averages for geographic concentration measures of institutional ownership. We report the 
mean state-level ownership concentration indices. Specifically, the first two columns report the Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index (HHI) of state-level institutional ownership across all U.S. states. The first column 
reports concentration index calculated using all states, while the index in the second column excludes the 
headquarters state.  The last column reports the geographical concentration index (GCI) of state-level institutional 
ownership across all U.S. states adjusted for the “natural” level of ownership concentration resulting from the 
geographical clustering of institutional investors.  
 
 
Ownership Concentration Measures × 100 
Year HHI 
HHI,  
excluding HQ state 
GCI 
1996 27.76 32.96 15.92 
1997 26.56 31.37 14.97 
1998 27.15 32.16 16.12 
1999 27.44 32.00 16.23 
2000 27.90 32.26 17.14 
2001 26.01 30.61 15.64 
2002 25.70 29.99 14.77 
2003 23.39 26.57 13.38 
2004 23.84 27.22 11.50 
2005 23.64 27.16 11.20 
2006 22.73 25.84 10.22 
2007 23.09 26.30 10.54 





Table IA-3. Local Ownership and Informed Trading Measures 
 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics for the 
relation between firm-level measures of informed trading in the year following the fiscal year end and the level of 
excess local institutional ownership as of the fiscal year end. LOCOWN is the excess local ownership, measured as 
the ownership ratio of institutional investors in the firm’s HQ state minus the average of those investors’ ownership 
ratio in other firms in that state. We control for time-varying firm and state characteristics and include year as well 
as state fixed effects. Post-2000 (Post-2003) is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years ending in calendar 
years 2001 and 2002 (2003 and onward). We interact these indicator variables with LOCOWN, but do not include 
the standalone variables since they are subsumed by the year fixed effects. PIN is the probability of private 
information related trade from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) model. ADJPIN and PSOS are PIN’s 
components from Duarte and Young (2009). ADJPIN is the probability of private information related trade from the 
extended model in Duarte and Young (2009), while PSOS is the probability that a given trade happens during a 
symmetric order flow shock. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 




Dependent Variable: Subsequent Year PIN 
 
PIN ADJPIN PSOS 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
LOCOWN 3.59 2.24 3.23 
 
(4.2) (4.6) (6.2) 
LOCOWN×FDSOX 2.20 −0.43 −0.22 
 
(1.6) (−0.6) (−0.3) 
LOCOWN×POSTSOX 4.40 −1.43 0.25 
 
(3.0) (−1.7) (0.3) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,406 12,406 12,406 





Table IA-4. Local Bias and Local Performance: Institution-Level Estimates, 
Conditional on Local Analyst Presence 
 
This table reports the local bias and local performance of institutional investors, sorted by the presence of local 
equity analysts. States are sorted into three groups based on the number of local analysts in the state: top 5 states, 
6th-20th states, and the rest of the states. Panel A reports the excess local holdings. Excess Local Holdings is the 
percentage of the investor's portfolio invested in stocks whose HQ are located in the investor's state minus the 
percentage of the ``market portfolio'' located in the investor's state. Panel B reports the average performance of 
institutional investors' local and non-local holdings. For each institution with non-zero portfolio weight in local 
stocks, we calculate the quarterly characteristics-adjusted returns of its local and non-local portfolios, as well as the 
performance differential (local minus non-local). Local Portfolio is comprised of stocks in the institutional investor's 
portfolio whose HQ are located in the investor's state, while Non-Local Portfolio is comprised of the rest of the 
institution's holdings. The portfolio returns are adjusted for the following three stock characteristics using the Daniel 
et al. (1997) method: size, book-to-market, and past 12-month return. We take the average of excess weights and 
adjusted returns across all institutions each quarter, and then calculate the time-series average of those quarterly 
averages. The quarterly averaging across institutions is weighted by the total dollar value of the institution's holdings 
at the beginning of the quarter. The figures reported in Panel B is the difference between the performance of local 
and non-local portfolios. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity following the Newey-West (1987) method. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 
Panel A. Excess Local Holdings 
 
1996-2000 2001-08 
High (Top 5 States)  3.04 1.82 
Medium (States 6-20)  3.32 2.28 
Low (Other States)  3.01 2.15 
 
    Panel B. Local minus Non-Local Performance 
 1996-2000 2001-08 
High (Top 5 States)  −1.07 (−1.8) −0.18 (−0.5) 
Medium (States 6-20)  0.87 (1.2) 0.14 (0.6) 





Table IA-5. Local Trading Bias, by Year 
 
This table presents fund-level local trading bias estimates for each year of our trading sample. Local trade bias is 
defined as the ratio of number of trades in stocks headquartered in the same state as the fund headquarter state to all 
trades made by the funds minus the ratio of number of stocks headquartered in the same state as the fund 
headquarter state to number of all stocks in both the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database with identifiable 
headquarter locations. Local volume bias is defined as the ratio of trading volume of stocks headquartered in the 
same state as the fund headquarter state to total trading volume made by the funds minus the ratio of total number of 
shares outstanding of stocks headquartered in the same state as the fund headquarter state to that of all stocks in both 
the ANcerno universe and the CRSP database with identifiable headquarter locations. Local dollar volume bias is 
defined as the ratio of dollar trading volume of stocks headquartered in the same state as the fund headquarter state 
to total dollar trading volume made by the funds minus the ratio of total market capitalization of stocks 
headquartered in the same state as the fund headquarter state to that of all stocks in both the ANcerno universe and 
the CRSP database with identifiable headquarter locations. We calculate the local trading biases for each fund within 
each quarter and then report the equal-weighted averages across all funds and quarters for each year of the sample in 
panel A. In Panel B, each fund-quarter observation is weighted by the total dollar volume of the fund’s trades in the 
quarter. All local trading biases are reported in percentage. The sample includes only common stocks (those with a 
share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database). Sample period is from January 1998 to December 2010.  
 
Panel A: Equal Weighted 
 
Local Trade Local Volume Local Dollar 
Year Bias Bias Volume Bias 
1998 0.541 -0.357 0.052 
1999 2.918 2.206 2.242 
2000 2.665 1.678 1.235 
2001 2.650 1.476 1.162 
2002 2.384 1.623 1.484 
2003 2.125 1.156 1.190 
2004 1.763 0.829 0.924 
2005 1.364 0.657 0.498 
2006 1.517 0.617 0.658 
2007 1.646 0.844 0.728 
2008 2.045 1.327 1.136 
2009 1.436 0.632 0.681 
2010 1.603 0.542 0.663 
 
Panel B: Dollar Weighted 
 
Local Trade Local Volume Local Dollar 
Year Bias Bias Volume Bias 
1998 3.710 5.859 4.105 
1999 1.036 2.057 2.267 
2000 1.254 0.917 1.029 
2001 1.283 0.509 0.386 
2002 1.176 0.762 0.588 
2003 1.035 0.811 0.682 
2004 2.885 0.739 0.566 
2005 2.539 0.951 0.812 
2006 2.082 1.098 0.932 
2007 2.574 0.851 0.791 
2008 1.942 1.397 1.285 
2009 1.219 0.832 0.789 




Table IA-6. Trading Activity and Profitability around Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports the abnormal local trading activity and profits around quarterly earnings announcements. Panel A 
reports the abnormal local (buy minus sell) trading imbalance, which is the average of daily abnormal local trading 
imbalance within each window. Daily abnormal local trading imbalance is the daily local trading imbalance on each 
day minus the mean daily local trading imbalance during [-60, -20] window, where day 0 is the earnings 
announcement day. The daily local trading imbalance is the ratio of daily local buy minus local sell to the total 
trading (local buy plus local sell plus nonlocal buy plus nonlocal sell). We calculate two different abnormal local 
trading imbalance measures using the number of trades and the dollar trading volume, respectively. Panel A1 reports 
the abnormal local trading imbalance prior to positive earnings surprises, while Panel A2 reports the abnormal local 
trading imbalance prior to negative earnings surprises. Panel B reports the relative profitability of local and non-
local trades. For each stock-quarter, we calculate the average raw return of local and non-local trades initiated in 
various windows ahead of the stock’s earnings announcements in that quarter. For each trade, we calculate the raw 
return from the execution price to the closing price of each of three hypothetical liquidation dates: the announcement 
day, five trading days after the announcement, and ten trading days after the announcement. We take the difference 
between the average raw return of local trades and non-local trades for each trading window of each earnings 
announcement, and then report the simple average across all announcements for each trading window. Panel B.1 
(B.2) presents the returns prior to positive (negative) earnings surprise. All trade returns are reported in percentage. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed based on two-way clustered standard errors. Institutional trading data 
are obtained from ANcerno Ltd. Firm headquarter location data are from SEC Analytic Suite. ANcerno fund 
headquarter location data are hand collected from SEC filings using the EDGAR. Local trades are those executed by 
ANcerno funds headquartered within the same state as firm headquarter state. Nonlocal trades are those executed by 
ANcerno funds headquartered outside the firm headquarter state. The sample includes only common stocks (those 
with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database). Sample period is from January 1999 to December 2010. 
 
Panel A: Local Buy-Sell Imbalance Prior to Earnings Announcement 
Trading Window 
 
Abnormal Local Trading Imbalance (Buy minus Sell), 
(centered at Earnings 
 
in % of Total Trading 
Announcement Day) 
 
Number of Trades 
 
Dollar Volume 
































Panel B: Local minus Non-Local Trade Returns Prior to Earnings Announcement 
  
Principal-Weighted Profits, in % 
 
Liquidation Date: Earnings Earnings Earnings 
  
Announcement Announcement Announcement 
  
Day Day +5 Day +10 
Panel B1: Positive Earnings Surprise 
[-12, -8] 0.082 (1.11) 0.181 (2.35) 0.290 (3.39) 
[-7, -3] 0.041 (0.70) 0.143 (2.03) 0.230 (2.47) 
[-2, -1] -0.052 (-0.85) -0.085 (-0.89) 0.007 (0.06) 
Panel B2: Negative Earnings Surprise 
[-12, -8] 0.313 (2.45) 0.315 (1.38) 0.351 (1.46) 
[-7, -3] 0.279 (2.99) 0.444 (3.72) 0.531 (3.80) 
[-2, -1] 0.113 (1.12) 0.154 (0.92) 0.286 (1.61) 
  
